Future historians may potentially refer to the Russia-Ukraine war as the “drone war” due to the central role the drone generation played in the entire conflict. In fact, the first months of the war were marked through the Russian Orlan-10 and Ukrainian Bayraktar TB-2 drones. In the existing phase of the war, Ukraine is reaching out and deploying new drones, while receiving gigantic quantities of drones as a component of foreign aid. Meanwhile, Russia has stepped up its reconnaissance drones and deployed giant quantities of evolved street munitions through joint progression efforts with other countries. As the war moves to 2025, drone generation will continue to evolve, with either side increasingly integrating swarm generation into their drone fleets.
Swarm generation allows multiple drones to serve as as a coordinated unit rather than as remoted entities. They have the prospective to be offering really extensive benefits, especially in coordinating an attack with real-time data sharing. For a undeniable swarm, a drone can supply Overwatch for other drones that carry out an attack, feeding other drone operators with data to make the attack more effective. More complex swarms would automate much of this process, so that when a drone in the swarm detects a counter-drone system, it can relay the main points of the risk to the rest of the swarm. The swarm can then autonomously take evasive movements to building up their probability of completing their mission. However, the algorithms behind this automation require decentralized yet synchronized decision-making in a dynamic environment, in the presence of enemy jamming. Recognizing those challenges, many countries are making an investment heavily in swarm generation and incorporating it into progression efforts and testing exercises.
Ukraine in existence has a merit in swarm generation thanks to its ability to take advantage of advances in the advertising sector, adding synthetic intelligence that supports a swarm’s ability to make decisions. It is commonly reported on social media that in the year beyond the year, Ukraine has deployed swarms of 3 to 10 drones, the point of autonomous collaboration between drones is unknown. Following existing trends, swarm length and autonomy point are expected to accumulate by 2025. Meanwhile, Russia has not yet incorporated swarm generation into its drone fleet. However, Alexei Rogozin, a leading figure in Russia’s drone industries recently said that Russia will begin aligning swarm systems this year out of need to keep up with Ukraine.
The integration of swarm technology is a natural response to advancements in counter-drone systems. Both Russia and Ukraine employ layered counter-drone defenses that include kinetic and non-kinetic measures. Non-kinetic systems use electronic warfare to exploit vulnerabilities in drone navigation and command signals. However, these systems typically are effective for a few weeks, at which time the targeted drones are updated to fix the exploited vulnerability. These systems are combined with kinetic counter-drone systems, which use projectiles to neutralize drones. These systems are being integrated into their short-range air defense networks, with smaller systems being pushed out to small units at the front.
Traditional Russian and Ukrainian defenses opposed to drones will face swarm-related challenges. Although non-kinetic formulas have the possibility of neutralizing giant teams of drones, as Russia did at the beginning of the war, the generation of swarms complicates this technique by requiring the simultaneous interference of many signals. Swarms typically operate on a nodal network, allowing a drone to obtain critical data from other drones even if a communication path is blocked. The short distances between drones increase their network signals, making them more difficult to interrupt. Kinetic formulas also face difficulties because they can only target a limited number of drones at a time. This forces the formula to prioritize which drones to attack, while the rest of the swarm adjusts its flight patterns to avoid being targeted.
Faced with such challenges, either party will have to adopt select methods to counter the risk of swarms. Once deployed, a swarm of drones will be difficult to stop, which is why greater efforts will be made to disrupt drones before they are launched. Attacks of this type are already occurring and Russia says its measures against Ukrainian infrastructure are aimed at disrupting Ukrainian drone advancement efforts. Meanwhile, Ukraine has recently attacked a garage facility containing 400 wireless Shahed munitions. The two sides will accentuate attacks against workshop-like and drone production sites, particularly facilities similar to the production of parts used in drones.
Wars have historically driven technological advancements, as both sides strive for an edge on the battlefield. World War I advanced automotive technology, while World War II propelled modern aviation. Similarly, the Russia-Ukraine War has accelerated drone development over the past 34 months. Today’s drones are significantly more advanced than those at the war’s onset, and as the conflict continues, swarm technology is emerging as the next logical step. As 2025 progresses, the Russian-Ukrainian battlefield will see an increasing number of swarming drones. In response, both sides will need to develop innovative strategies to counter the escalating drone threat.
The article was updated on January 4 thanks to readers’ comments. The following adjustments were made:
1) I added more discussion to discuss that swarms can operate at different levels of autonomy.
2) I have added the references for Russian and Ukrainian projections that the use of swarms generation will continue to increase in 2025.