Underlying any war is a giant logistics network that ensures adequate infantry men obtain the correct device at the right time. As such, logistics networks for Ukraine and Russia are extensive, and offer resources to the forces that extend on a front of 1,000 km. Each aspect has thousands of armored vehicles, burning giant amounts of diesel fuel daily. Meanwhile, the Russians attract approximately 10,000 artillery balls consisting of Day, and the Ukrainians attract 2,000. Without a source without fuel and ammunition, Russian and Ukrainian struggle forces would be made in a useless struggle. Given the criticality and inherent vulnerabilities of these source lines, the two parts accentuate the efforts to bother them.
The canals of Russian origin are made up of giant depots basically located in Russia, from which aircraft have been walking to their front-line infantry men in Ukraine. Russian forces recently achieve offensive operations in Ukraine, adding attempts to capture the city of Kharkiv, Vovchansk and Chasiv Yar. Disrupted source lines would hamper their ability to unleash a mechanized attack on Ukrainian defenses, restricting the effectiveness of those operations. These demanding logistical situations were not unusual at the beginning of the war for Russia, resulting in many of its initial offensive failures. , their logistical operations have become more physically powerful as the war has continued. Despite those improvements, the recent logistical situations they demand have played a vital role in reducing the planned summer offensive for a battalion-sized attack on Donetsk Oblast.
The Ukrainian strategy has been double. First, the Ukrainian army is using drones to destroy Russian deposits. In early August, the Ukrainians hit Russian fuel deposits in the regions of Belgorod, Kursk and Rostov. In addition, the Ukrainians attacked and destroyed a deposit of Russian ammunition in Voronezh in early July. The Ukrainians are reaching the deepest deposits in Russia, since their drones are more sophisticated. Meanwhile, Russians are suffering to obtain those deposits with air defense systems good enough to protect them.
The Ukrainians have also attacked cars of Russian origin. The Russian army uses a mixture of army logistics trucks, such as the GAZ-66 and Kamaz 43118, and has contracted advertising trucks. While these resource trucks have out of the road, they are limited to roads, especially when they are loaded with fuel and ammunition. This limited maneuverability makes the source lines highly vulnerable to drones and artillery as they approach the front. According to Oryxspoenkop, Russian forces are wasting about 90 resources of resources consisting of the month, so it contains a meaningful meaning. part of its vehicle losses. These figures probably decrease that the actual number of destroyed cars, since Oryxspioenkop is based on open source photographs and videos.
Meanwhile, the Russians are also heading to Ukrainian source lines. Earlier this year, the Russians made really extensive gains when Ukraine was reduced in artillery ammunition provided through the West. Although there is now consistent ammunition in Ukraine, Russia is looking to prevent it from reaching the front. The Ukrainians have a defensive belt that stretches from Kharkiv in eastern Ukraine to Kherson in the south. Due to unbreakable Ukrainian defenses, the Russians have made only marginal gains in recent months. However, if the Russians can diminish the Ukrainian source lines, the Ukrainians would not have the artillery force that limited Russian operations.
The Russians have tried tactics similar to the Ukrainians but with limited success. Since Ukraine is on the defensive, they have a more established network to supply materials to the front lines, with greater coverage for their deposits. As such, the Russians decide to achieve softer objectives in Ukraine, adding the power infrastructure. Meanwhile, Ukraine are increasingly non -military cars for their refueling, which are more difficult to attack and hit.
Faced with these challenges, the Russian military has adopted a different strategy. Instead of targeting supply depots and resupply vehicles directly, they are scattering landmines on the roads used by Ukrainian supply routes. Using artillery-delivered mine systems, the Russians can remotely scatter anti-tank mines across the roads, rendering them impassable without meticulous demining efforts. These anti-tank mines are often accompanied by anti-personnel mines to further hinder the clearing process. This tactic has reportedly been employed in Kharkiv Oblast to disrupt Ukrainian resupply efforts ahead of an anticipated large-scale offensive operation.
Warfare experts, ranging from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz, have stressed that a country cannot win a war without a robust logistics network. Similarly, military leaders, from Hannibal to Napoleon, have learned the hard lessons of needing to maintain their supply lines. In the current brutal war of attrition between Ukraine and Russia, where gains are limited, it is logical that both sides would focus on severing each other’s supply channels. Should either side succeed in doing so, they would gain a significant advantage in this grinding conflict, likely playing a key role in the war’s outcome.
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