The United States is a world superpower subsidized through numerous military sites around the world. By the end of this decade, China could have its own booming network.
The doctrine of the U. S. military begins in peacetime with a sustained or alternating presence in strategic locations outside the continental United States: airfields, seaports, and camps, as well as weapons depots, administrative offices, and educational complexes. Habitation: In Ally, Friendly, or Impartial territory.
This global posture has been maintained for decades in the call to protect the national interest, and it is very likely that the wonderful brand of force will be reproduced through China, in whole or in part, as its own economic and security interests grow.
American soldiers, sailors and airmen operate from bases that involve multiple sites, but not each and every site constitutes a military base. Unclassified documents, such as the Pentagon’s annual base design report, also record ownership of recreational areas, adding parks and golf courses.
The only official report on US installations in the world is published at the end of the fiscal year through the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations and Environment, which oversees all military sites used by the US branch of Defense.
Newsweek’s interactive map shows in blue the city or locality closest to separately indexed military sites outside the United States or U. S. territory, as well as the branch of service that uses it. Chinese sites are shown in red and probable sites are shown in pink.
U. S. military sites located in key regional centers such as Hawaii or Guam, the westernmost point of the United States, were not included in the presence map. Similarly, China’s militarized synthetic islands in the Spratly and Paracel archipelagos in the South China Sea were excluded.
As of September 2023, more than 40 countries and territories were home to U. S. sites larger than 10 acres or valued at more than $10 million. Together, they accounted for less than 10 percent of the Pentagon’s total stock of 4,800 sites, on just about 26. 8 million acres of land, valued at about $2. 2 trillion.
Among the sites are disused facilities that are still under US jurisdiction or awaiting removal. In an example that would likely supersede the following estimate, the U. S. military this week ceded an American-built air base to Niger’s ruling junta, giving U. S. troops until mid-September to leave Agadez.
The Pentagon’s database is detailed, though not exhaustive, and lacks clandestine sites used by more than a dozen military intelligence agencies, as well as access granted under visiting forces agreements, a non-permanent counterpart to signed status agreements. between Washington and the treaty. allies such as Tokyo.
One such agreement is the US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, under which visiting US forces can build and operate nine Philippine-owned military bases in the archipelago, adding to hotspots such as the Strait of Taiwan.
A year ago, Papua New Guinea awarded the United States six airports and seaports as part of a historic security deal in the South Pacific, a region that has seen the geopolitical fest between Washington and Beijing intensify.
A July report by the Congressional Research Service estimates that the U. S. Department of Defense uses at least 128 bases in at least 51 other countries, with charge estimates ranging from $30 billion to $50 billion a year.
Quarterly statistics from the U. S. Defense Manpower Data Centeras of March, there were 54,774 army workers on active duty in Japan, 35,068 in Germany, 24,234 in South Korea and 12,375 in Italy, with a total of 169,117 soldiers deployed overseas, joining the US. embassies and consulates. the world.
The role of forward presence as a US projection force has long been noted to achieve the dual goals of deterring adversaries and reassuring allies, but this strategy carries significant political dangers and requires intense diplomacy.
Host countries retain ultimate sovereignty over their territory and, as was the case with Niger, can limit or revoke US access at any time, adding after a government replacement. And if they did, defense planners would likely not be guaranteed full use of Army sites as staging spaces due to imaginable public opposition.
China’s overseas and basing search will face similar challenges, according to U. S. defense and intelligence assessments, but dangers related to the variety of sites can be mitigated.
A December 2022 study by the Rand Corp. think tank. it ranked more than a hundred potential applicants based on their timeliness and feasibility and found that Bangladesh, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Pakistan were the countries most likely to meet Beijing’s requirements.
The four neighbors participated in the Belt and Road Initiative, President Xi Jinping’s ambitious plan to expand his country’s economic footprint in land and sea connections. According to Rand’s authors, economic security and the legitimacy of the internal regime are the main points that have led the Chinese army to inevitably move away from its shores.
The People’s Liberation Army Navy Task Forces have been carrying out non-stop anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden since 2008. Since 2017, Chinese navy escorts have passed through a logistics base in the port of Doraleh, in Djibouti.
“Establishing the base in Djibouti was a joint resolution of the two countries. The final touch and commissioning of the base will help China better meet its external obligations, such as escort in the Gulf of Aden and waters off the coast of Somalia, as well as humanitarian aid operations,” Liu Pengyu, a spokesman for the Chinese embassy in Washington, told Newsweek. Anno Domini.
“It will also herald Djibouti’s economic and social progress and China will make new contributions to safeguarding peace and stability in Africa and the world,” he said.
The only publicly identified Chinese base is five kilometers west of Camp Lemonnier, the only permanent US military base in Africa, and about a dozen other services operate through US allies at this critical shipping node.
Last fall, the Pentagon’s annual report on Chinese military strength said the Djibouti facilities “are most likely capable of hosting the PLA Navy’s aircraft carriers, other giant fighters, and submarines. “
“Beyond the PLA base in Djibouti, the [People’s Republic of China] is probably already contemplating and making plans to expand the army’s logistical facilities for the projection of naval, air, and ground forces,” the report says.
“If realized, a PLA global military logistics network could disrupt U. S. military operations as the People’s Republic of China’s global military objectives evolve,” the Pentagon said, noting the presence of Chinese military instructors in the Solomon Islands, Congo and Tanzania.
Liu, a spokesman for the embassy, said China’s security cooperation is carried out “on the basis of equality and gaining mutual advantages with other countries. “
“The United States operates more than 800 military bases around the world and has long been the world’s biggest fear. The last thing they do is judge other countries,” Liu said.
The United States Department of Defense responded to requests for comment.
In March, an unclassified report released through the Office of the Director of National Intelligence indicated that the Chinese government “is considering deploying military facilities in several locations,” adding Cuba and the United Arab Emirates, longtime spouses of the United States. United in the fight against terrorism.
Last month, an investigation by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think tank, concluded that China likely operates secret listening stations at four sites in Cuba, adding up to three near the capital Havana and one near Santiago de Cuba. Cuba, 65 kilometers west of Cuba. U. S. Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.
Closer to home, Chinese naval ships have docked at Cambodia’s newly renovated Ream Naval Base for more than six months, satellite images showed this summer, but Beijing and Phnom Penh have objected to the description as an established Chinese base.
“China’s search for bases is a natural evolution in its aim to become a superpower, a concept that is not new and was perfectly summarized in Alfred Thayer Mahan’s book, The Influence of Sea Power on History: 1660 -1783, which profoundly influences its naval policy doctrine,” said Bryce Barros, a former congressional foreign policy adviser based in Washington, D. C.
“For now, the United States does not deserve to worry about the number of Chinese bases abroad, which is insignificant compared to the number of Chinese bases in the United States. However, the United States will have to continue to engage its partners and allies. Chinese plans at the Ream Naval Base, which China could use in the event of an emergency in the South China Sea,” Barros told Newsweek.
In June, a Rand study of Chinese military writings found that “the PLA has neither the goal nor the capability to use Chinese military bases to launch preemptive strikes or other operations. “offensives opposed to U. S. forces or interests in a long-term clash between the United States and China until at least 2030. “”.
Chinese overseas bases may simply be non-combatant evacuation operations, sea lane patrols and “non-kinetic” missions opposed to US activities, the authors say (in military parlance it refers to intelligence gathering or cyber attacks ).
“However, a network of bases may simply raise indirect security considerations for the United States by complicating US defense plans in highly dubious and conflict-prone countries, which are most likely to grant the Republic “Popular China access or permission to build large-scale permanent bases,” the report says.
John Feng is Newsweek’s Asia editor-in-chief, based in Taichung, Taiwan. He focuses on East Asian politics. He covered foreign policy and defense issues, especially regarding US-China and China-Taiwan relations. John joined Newsweek in 2020 after reporting from Central Europe and the United Kingdom. He graduated from National Chengchi University in Taipei and SOAS, University of London. Languages: English and Chinese.
You can contact John by emailing j. feng@newsweek. com.
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