One of the most tantalizing split screens in Asian geopolitics is that of divergent perspectives in Tokyo and Beijing on Donald Trump’s presidency.
On one screen: Japanese policymakers are losing sleep over the prospect of how a Trump 2. 0 White House could simply reignite industrial wars and harm Tokyo’s national security.
On the other, the Chinese who would like to see Trump defeat Kamala Harris on November 5.
Of course, this goes against popular belief. Many Japanese experts like to think that Tokyo survived Trump’s term from 2017 to 2021 well and can do it again. Chinese observers tend to argue that Xi Jinping lives in semi-constant worry about Trump’s decision. tariff mania.
Of course, the specter of a 60% tax on goods from the mainland, starting with Trump, worries Xi’s Communist Party. UBS estimates that this would reduce China’s annual expansion by more than half, removing 2. 5 percentage points from gross domestic product in Asia’s largest economy.
This would come at a time when China is already grappling with a crumbling asset sector, weak retail spending and considerations of developing deflation.
But talk of “trade with Trump” doesn’t understand why China would be pleased to see Trump back in the Oval Office. And why is Japan so afraid of this prospect?
China has gained more than lost thanks to Trump’s 1. 0 price lists on mainland goods and general irregularity. No matter how much economic gibberish there is from Trump, the price lists were paid for through American consumers, not China.
While no laughing matter for Beijing, Trump’s price lists ended up hurting Japan and South Korea, staunch United States allies, the most. China temporarily turned to other markets and diversified its supply chains. Officials in Tokyo and Seoul have been far less nimble on the front of the collateral damage that is taking place.
What China has gained, however, are the divisions between Washington and Asia’s major democracies. Trump’s industrial wars have generated genuine distrust of Asia. They have even nurtured a certain sympathy for China, which has allowed Xi to claim a higher ethical stance and appear more committed to capitalism. rules than Trump.
Domestically, Trump’s anti-China rhetoric has helped Xi obtain aid for the Communist Party. Trump’s rhetorical attacks in the midst of the Covid-19 crisis – also accompanied by racist catcalls – have divided global support for primary investigations into what happened in Wuhan.
Trump’s disastrous domestic handling of the pandemic has hampered the U. S. economy costly. The need for huge fiscal stimulus has not only put the United States on the path to a $35 trillion national debt. Ironically, this has increased Washington’s dependence on Asian savings – in addition to those of China – to finance its excesses.
The way Trump attacked the Federal Reserve (and threatened to fire Chairman Jerome Powell) made it easier for Xi to mobilize everyone in favor of a dollar option. This includes expanding the use of the yuan in industry and finance, specifically among “Southern” countries.
The day Trump withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership initiated by the United States was a historic day for Xi’s inner circle. So is Trump’s misguided approach to bilateral industrial deals at the expense of broader efforts to build a bulwark opposed to Chinese dominance.
The Joe Biden era reminded Xi’s party of the success it had under Trump. For all the uproar over gigantic tax cuts and regulatory rollbacks, the Trump years have done little to build economic strength.
Instead, by intimidating Detroit into making more fuel-efficient cars, Trump spent four years paving the way for Team Xi to dominate the electric vehicle sector. And to weaken the United States’ ability to compete in the Chinese-led battery revolution.
Trump’s worldview is stuck in 1985, when price lists and currency deals dominated the world. President Biden, love it or hate it, has been more focused on getting the United States in better shape to compete in the global economy it will face in 2025 and beyond. beyond.
The vision of “Project 2025”, drawn up for Trump Republicans, is more taken from Margaret Atwood’s book, The Handmaid’s Tale, than from the pages of Adam Smith.
Biden’s 2025 strategy has seen his White House invest in infrastructure and semiconductors. Their goal was to make it more complicated for Xi’s “Made in China 2025” plan to master the long-term of chips, renewable energy, biotechnology, aerospace, synthetic intelligence and green infrastructure. and autonomous vehicles.
With less emphasis and more surgical precision, the Biden-Harris administration has made it difficult for China to acquire important technologies for semiconductors, artificial intelligence, satellites, and weapons systems. Good luck for Russia or North Korea to fill those gaps.
All of this explains why Xi would want a Trump term and why a Harris administration would be much less likely to set its own economic goals on the global stage.
Meanwhile, Japan is still trying to catch up as the United States political world is spinning, and still spinning. After Biden’s disastrous performance in the June 27 debate, Tokyo hardened at the idea that Trump might return.
This is terrible news for Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, whose approval score is stuck at best around 25 points. Since 2021, Kishida has dedicated much of his political capital to closer ties with Biden. Just as Biden’s Democratic Party now has a new standard-bearer, Kishida’s Liberal Democratic Party is now looking for a new face.
The economy is an immediate concern. At a time when Japan is avoiding recession and the family’s calling is weak, a larger industrial war would hit the country hard. It would also complicate the Bank of Japan’s initiative to move interest rates away from zero.
National security too. Would Trump welcome Kim Jong Un to the Oval Office? Would he shake up Tokyo again by providing it with $8 billion a year in buffer cash to accommodate US troops? Could Trump reach a bilateral industrial agreement with China and Japan?
There is a misconception that former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe dealt with the Trump years skillfully. Not so, as Tokyo was not given a free hand in Trump’s industrial war. And how, from Beijing to Pyongyang, Trump finally allowed Japan’s adversaries to do so.
The most common misconception is that Japan would agree with four more years of Trump, while China would not. The other side of the coin is true.